WATER, SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY: INDIA'S RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN'S LAWFARE

The recent comments by Pakistani lawyer Hassan Aslam Shad regarding India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance reflect a familiar Pakistani strategy: combining diplomatic rhetoric with legal activism, or what many analysts describe as “lawfare.” His argument portrays India as undermining international law, but it ignores the larger security environment that has shaped New Delhi’s decision-making over the past two decades.

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the support of the World Bank, is often cited as one of the world's most durable water-sharing agreements. Under the treaty, Pakistan received rights over the three western rivers—the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—which account for nearly 80 percent of the basin’s waters, while India retained rights over the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. Despite being the upper riparian state, India accepted a highly generous arrangement in the interest of regional stability and peaceful coexistence.

Even under the treaty, India retained rights to construct run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects, irrigation works, and storage facilities within specific technical limits. However, Pakistan has repeatedly objected to many Indian projects, often taking disputes to international forums. While legal mechanisms are part of the treaty framework, Pakistan’s consistent efforts to delay or challenge Indian infrastructure projects have been viewed in India as attempts to prevent legitimate utilization of its allocated water resources.

The central question today is not merely about water. It is about whether a state can continue to enjoy the benefits of international agreements while simultaneously allowing its territory to be used by terrorist organizations targeting its neighbor.

India's position hardened following a series of major terrorist attacks linked to Pakistan-based groups. These incidents fundamentally altered public and political perceptions regarding bilateral engagement.

The first major turning point was the Uri attack on September 18, 2016. Four heavily armed terrorists attacked an Indian Army brigade headquarters near Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 19 Indian soldiers. The attack was one of the deadliest assaults on the Indian military in decades. Investigations pointed toward Pakistan-based terrorist networks. India responded by conducting surgical strikes across the Line of Control against terrorist launch pads, signaling a shift from strategic restraint to proactive deterrence.

The second major attack was the Pulwama bombing on February 14, 2019. A suicide bomber targeted a convoy of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), killing 40 personnel. The attack was claimed by Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist organization. In response, India carried out air strikes on terrorist infrastructure in Balakot. The Pulwama attack further strengthened the argument within India that terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil remained a persistent national security challenge.

The third and most recent attack frequently cited in discussions on India-Pakistan relations is the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Like previous incidents, it reinforced concerns regarding cross-border terrorism and highlighted the continuing vulnerability of civilians and security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Such attacks deepen public anger and reduce political space for confidence-building measures between the two countries.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s criticism of India’s water policy appears disconnected from the broader reality of bilateral relations. International agreements are founded on principles of trust, good faith, and mutual respect. When one party believes that the other is actively supporting or tolerating forces responsible for violence and instability, sustaining the spirit of cooperation becomes increasingly difficult.

Critics argue that India’s decision regarding the treaty could undermine regional stability. However, supporters contend that New Delhi is not seeking to deny water to Pakistan but rather to maximize the utilization of water resources that are already permitted under the treaty framework. For decades, India underutilized many of its allocated rights due to infrastructure limitations and political considerations. Accelerating dam construction, hydropower generation, irrigation projects, and water storage facilities is viewed by many Indian strategists as a sovereign right and a developmental necessity.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s attempt to frame the issue exclusively as a legal dispute overlooks the security dimension. No country can be expected to separate terrorism from broader bilateral relations indefinitely. The repeated occurrence of major terrorist attacks has created a perception in India that Pakistan seeks the advantages of cooperation while avoiding accountability for cross-border terrorism.

The broader lesson is that peace in South Asia cannot be achieved solely through treaties, legal arguments, or international forums. Sustainable peace requires a genuine commitment to preventing terrorism, dismantling extremist infrastructure, and fostering trust between neighbors. Water-sharing agreements function best when accompanied by stable political relations and mutual confidence.

Ultimately, the debate over the Indus Waters Treaty is not simply about river flows or legal clauses. It is about the future of India-Pakistan relations. India maintains that its actions are aimed at safeguarding national interests, enhancing water security, and responding to an altered strategic environment shaped by decades of terrorism. Pakistan, meanwhile, continues to emphasize legal and diplomatic avenues. Until the underlying issue of cross-border terrorism is addressed credibly and comprehensively, disputes over water are likely to remain intertwined with the larger question of regional security.

In this context, India’s reassessment of the Indus Waters Treaty reflects not only a water policy decision but also a broader strategic message: long-term cooperation requires both sides to uphold their responsibilities, including the fundamental obligation to prevent terrorism and maintain regional stability.